Where a name lives
Points a name at an IP address: A for an IPv4 address, AAAA for an IPv6 address. This is how browsers find your website’s server.
Example: www A 192.0.2.10
sheldns.net · the DNS domain of BS Management
Your domain’s DNS settings decide where your website lives and whether your email lands in the inbox. This page explains how it all works. When you want it set up or checked, BS Management can help.
DNS, the Domain Name System, is the internet’s directory. It turns a name like example.com into the addresses and settings computers need: where the website is, which servers take the email, and more. No single server holds it all. The answers are spread out and handed down from the top.
A small part of your device’s software, the stub resolver, sends the question to a recursive resolver, usually run by your internet provider, your network or a public DNS service.
If it already holds a fresh copy of the answer, it replies straight away. Most everyday lookups end here.
If not, it starts at the root. A root server doesn’t know the answer, but it knows which servers answer for each top-level domain, such as .net or .com, and points the resolver there.
The .net servers don’t hold your records either. They hold the delegation: the NS records naming your domain’s authoritative name servers.
These hold your domain’s records, the ones you edit at your DNS host, and give the actual answer: an address, a mail server, a text record.
The resolver returns the answer and keeps it for the record’s TTL, its “time to live” in seconds. Even “no such name” answers are cached for a while.
Why changes take time to show up: resolvers keep using a cached answer until its TTL runs out. Lowering a record’s TTL well ahead of a planned change, at least one old TTL beforehand, shortens that wait.
A domain’s DNS is a list of records. Each has a name, a type, a TTL and a value. These five do most of the work.
Points a name at an IP address: A for an IPv4 address, AAAA for an IPv6 address. This is how browsers find your website’s server.
Example: www A 192.0.2.10
Makes one name an alias for another, and resolvers follow it to the target’s records. A name with a CNAME can’t hold any other records, so a bare domain like example.com can’t be a CNAME.
Example: shop CNAME shops.example.net.
Names the servers that accept mail for your domain, each with a preference number. Senders try the lowest number first. An MX points at a host name, not an IP address.
Example: @ MX 10 mail.example.com.
Free-form text attached to a name. SPF, DKIM and DMARC all live in TXT records, and so do many “prove you own this domain” checks.
Example: @ TXT "v=spf1 mx -all"
Names the authoritative name servers for the domain. The registry holds a copy so it can point resolvers to them. Change your name servers and you’ve moved control of every other record.
Example: @ NS ns1.example.net.
The addresses and names in these examples are reserved for documentation and don’t point anywhere real.
Anyone can put your domain in the From: line of an email. These three DNS-based standards let receiving mail servers check whether a message really came from you, and tell them what you’d like done when it didn’t.
A TXT record listing the servers allowed to send mail for your domain. Receivers check it against the envelope sender (the bounce address used in the mail exchange), and can also check the server’s HELO name. It doesn’t check the From: address people see.
Keep it lean: checking a record may take at most 10 DNS lookups (include, a, mx and friends). Go over and SPF fails with a permanent error.
The sending server signs each message. The matching public key sits in DNS at selector._domainkey.yourdomain. A valid signature shows that the signing domain took responsibility and that the signed parts weren’t changed on the way.
Each service that sends for you, such as a newsletter tool or a help desk, usually gets its own selector and key.
A TXT record at _dmarc.yourdomain. A message passes DMARC when SPF or DKIM passes for a domain that aligns with the visible From: domain. The record also states your policy for failing mail and where receivers should send reports.
DMARC began as RFC 7489 in 2015. In May 2026 it became an IETF Proposed Standard, RFC 9989, with reporting in RFC 9990 and RFC 9991.
The big mailbox providers now require authentication. Since February 2024, Gmail has required every sender to its personal accounts to use SPF or DKIM, and anyone sending more than 5,000 messages a day there to have SPF, DKIM, a DMARC record (a policy of none is enough) and a From: domain aligned with SPF or DKIM. Yahoo set similar rules for bulk senders the same month. Since May 2025, Outlook.com expects the same from domains sending it more than 5,000 messages a day.
Gmail says mail that doesn’t meet its requirements might not be delivered as expected or might be marked as spam. Outlook.com sends non-compliant high-volume mail to Junk and may reject it. Smaller senders aren’t exempt: unauthenticated mail is simply easier for filters to distrust, and easier for someone else to fake as you.
DMARC gives you a feedback loop. Add a rua address to your record and mail providers send you aggregate reports: which servers sent mail using your domain, how many messages, and whether each passed SPF, DKIM and DMARC.
So it’s easy to publish a record, collect reports nobody opens, and never get past monitoring.
A policy is a request, and the receiver makes the final call. The usual path is none, then quarantine, then reject, fixing each legitimate sender along the way. RFC 9989 dropped the old pct= tag; a t=y flag now marks a stricter policy as a test, applied one level lower.
We read the reports so you don’t have to, and turn them into a short list of changes that help your mail get delivered.
rua at usTo point your reports at us, start on the BS Management contact page. This page does not name a reporting address. Reports sent to another domain need a short authorization record on the receiving side (RFC 9990, section 4); that’s part of getting set up.
We unpack the XML, work out which services send as your domain, and separate your real mail from anyone spoofing it.
Plain suggestions, such as adding a missing sender to SPF, turning on DKIM for a tool, or when it’s safe to move to a stricter policy.
IncludedIncluded automatically for BS Management website customers.
In developmentA standalone subscription is in development and isn’t available yet.
To point your DMARC reports at us, ask via the BS Management contact page.
BS Management · Colorado
BS Management builds websites and handles the domain, DNS and hosting setup behind them, so you hold the keys. Tell us what you need.